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As 2015 approaches, Kenya has a high-profile
position in dialogue around the new development
framework. Through Betty Maina (of the Kenya
Association of Manufacturers), Kenya has
provided one of the four African members of the
High-Level Panel appointed by the Secretary-
General to advise on the global development
framework beyond 2015, the target date for the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the
related dialogue on Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), the Kenyan Permanent
Representative to New York has been elected to
co-chair the Open Working Group. A third
Kenyan, the author of this piece Mwangi
Waituru, is co-chairing the leading global
campaign, Beyond 2015, which brings together
over 700 civil society organisations and NGOs,
seeking to influence the post-2015 framework. 
However, the current leadership and influence
that Kenyans are displaying in the post-2015
dialogue is not built on unwavering engagement
or indisputable success during the MDG period.
Indeed, this article presents an analysis of
Kenya’s response to the MDGs, highlighting ways
in which the framework was seen as an external
requirement guiding access to international aid,
rather than a shared commitment to core
development priorities. It provides lessons on how
to build greater and more equitable ownership of
global policy discourse. 
1 Implementing the MDGs
Kenya’s experience with the MDGs needs to be
understood within the context of the economic,
demographic and political trajectory of the
country, both internally and with regard to
international relations. 
In the ten years prior to the MDG period, Kenya
was struggling to provide basic services and
support development. The effects of a freeze on
bilateral aid, indebtedness and the strictures of
structural adjustment had their roots in the
1980s, resulting in deterioration at all levels,
including widespread dilapidation of roads, power
infrastructure, health care facilities, schools and
government offices. A growing population
demanded improved services, and the government
had struggled to meet its obligations. 
In this context, the government was highly likely
to agree to any international development
framework that brought with it the promise of
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development assistance. The MDGs, which
appeared to be an agreement between donor and
recipient countries (Melamed 2011), were thus
timely and welcome.
Having signed up to the MDGs, however, the
government response reflected the notion that
the framework was essentially top-down, with
work towards the goals very much the agenda of
the donors. The MDG process had no traction
until 2004, when work started on preparations
for the MDGs+5 summit. With financial
motivation from the Government of Finland and
the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), the Government of Kenya agreed to
implement ‘Mainstreaming MDGs in Kenya’s
Development Process’ (known as the MDGs
Project, with an implementation unit established
under the Ministry of Finance). Its objective was
to mainstream MDGs in the planning, budgetary
and development processes.
Under this project, one of the first actions taken
by the government was a cost study that sought
to establish a budget for achieving the MDGs.
The study identified a financing gap of KSh 4.1
trillion (Mailu 2013), some four times larger
than the annual national budget. The study
further underpinned the notion that the MDGs
were an external framework, far removed from
the possible business of government. 
In time, however, the MDGs Project managed to
develop a level of influence across government
(Muyumbu 2008). A cabinet directive in 2005
required all ministries to mainstream MDGs in
their policies, programmes, budgets and
operations. This brought the MDGs into a more
central position in the country’s development
process. By 2009, sectoral planning units had
been trained on MDG mainstreaming, and
government required each ministry to ensure
that at least two MDGs or core poverty-related
projects were explicitly reflected in their
programmes, targets and reporting. 
Despite apparently greater traction, however,
progress towards the achievement of MDGs
remained slow. In line with many other countries,
the MDGs Project in Kenya signed up to a project
promoted by UNDP. Nine pilot districts were
selected as sites for the development of best
practices for MDG achievement, intended for
national scale-up. While results in those districts
may have been positively impacted by the project,
it is nonetheless clear that the generic and
project-based response to slow progress was
strongly indicative of a process that had remained
strongly donor-driven, and outside the core
business of government. 
Further, a lack of coherence between the MDGs
and other instruments for development planning
creates cause for concern. For example, the
Vision 2030 process, driven in many countries by
the World Bank, has subsumed the aim of
reducing poverty under targets for economic
growth. The diversity of somewhat ambiguous
frameworks and targets serves to reinforce the
idea that they are essentially a means for
directing external assistance. 
2 Towards the new development framework
As we move towards 2015, a lot has changed in
Kenya that is likely to influence engagement in
both design and implementation. 
The newly elected government is led by a
President and Deputy President who are facing
charges at the International Criminal Court
(ICC), emanating from the post-election
violence of 2008. This is so because Kenya is a
signatory to the treaty that establishes the ICC;
most likely given in the spirit of hoping and/or
believing that this and similar assents were a
requirement for development assistance. 
One consequence of this that is already very clear
is that the government will be more proactive in
the design of international agreements, and more
careful in deciding what it chooses to endorse.
The current Kenyan leadership will undoubtedly
develop a strong position on post-2015 proposals.
Furthermore, it is likely to work to mobilise peer
support for this position from the African Union
(AU), and to help strengthen the voice of the AU
in global debates. 
Despite being represented in both, Kenya’s
influence on the interplay and outcome of having
parallel MDG and SDG processes could be
greatly strengthened. Given the different origins
and separate paths of each, the work around
both at national level has remained rather
separate. It is hosted under different ministries
(Planning and Environment respectively),
without any active process of coordination or
collaboration. Further, Kenya’s engagement at
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global level as co-chair of the SDG Open
Working Group is a third separate process. The
Permanent Representative’s work has been
conducted with no reference to the domestic
processes around MDGs and SDGs, and with no
links to the lead ministries. Despite the Kenyan
government’s wish to increase its engagement in
international processes, this splintered and
uncoordinated approach has greatly diluted the
potential influence that Kenya could have on the
outcomes of the post-2015 MDG/SDG debate. 
The sense that the MDGs and any possible
successors are externally driven and top down
remains strong in Kenya. A recent consultative
meeting on post-2015 saw one senior government
officer asking why the government should pursue
distractive global frameworks when it had a
national development agenda to pursue. Some
complained that the donors had not produced
funds to support ‘their’ MDGs, whilst others
argued that Kenya had spent too much on
reporting, monitoring and evaluation that had
been required elsewhere. 
Given such feelings, it is unlikely that the Kenyan
government will endorse a global framework that
appears limited to guiding aid deliveries. In
contrast, an acceptable new framework for the
country is likely to be economic growth-oriented,
setting out commitments of all nations to fairer
and more equitable development. This agenda
may encompass fairer terms of trade, climate
change, tax justice, representative global
governance and so on.
3 A policy framework for the people
Notwithstanding the significance of national and
international processes, it is important to
remember that the post-2015 framework is not
for states, but for people. Outside government,
the people of Kenya are asking how the new
framework will influence the policies that affect
their daily lives. They want to know how it will
contribute to the realisation of rights and to
providing human dignity to Kenyans. 
There are many examples of processes and
movements, at the national and local level,
seeking concrete changes for ordinary Kenyans.
The civil society organisations engaged in these
struggles see these as a necessary means of
addressing structural inequalities, intended to
bring about a transformative shift in power and
resource distribution. In this context, there are
pertinent questions about the effectiveness of a
global framework. In particular, there are
fundamental concerns around whether national
governments and multinational organisations are
likely to agree to and give leadership around the
sort of structural changes that are needed to
address inequalities at all levels. 
There are times when the policies and
programmes adopted in pursuit of these have
been grounded in a ‘charitable’ approach. At
best, this has failed to address the root causes of
poverty or expand the realisation of human
rights. At worst, it can smother the pursuit of
transformative change and perpetuate
vulnerability and dependence. Where
‘development’ comes to mean rather lacklustre
progress on some basic needs, it cannot be said
to reflect a framework or agenda that seeks
genuine change for the poor. 
If the results of the new development agenda are
to achieve transformative change for the
majority of Kenyans, it is important that the
MDG/SDG frameworks are grounded in human
rights and reinforce existing state commitments
to international human rights commitments.
There is a risk that MDG/SDG frameworks will
fall short of the standards and goals already
framed in international treaties, thus providing a
convenient distraction, and a basis on which
states can fall short of the human rights
standards already agreed. 
In 2010, the Seed Institute and the African
Monitor conducted a series of poverty hearings
in Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique and South
Africa. A panel of eminent persons listened to
first-hand testimonials from people living in
poverty – testimonials that were given with great
dignity. It was notable that the people who spoke
were not waiting for charity, but seeking
opportunity to improve their lives. Some were
forced into impossible and risky choices but they
were fighting for their lives. A case in point was
an HIV-positive 14-year-old Kenyan boy who
proudly narrated how he had built for himself a
house from profits made out of selling diesel fuel
syphoned by truck drivers from the trucks they
are employed to drive (Seed Institute 2010). 
From the poverty hearings, it is clear that people
are sure about the development they want to see.
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As grassroots communities describe their lived
realities, it is evident that what they envision is
not necessarily what outsiders think they want.
The strongest message from communities is a
deep desire for the power to make decisions on
issues that affect their lives; for access to equal
opportunities; and for an enabling environment
to sustain livelihoods. 
Brought to bear on the Post-2015 Development
Agenda, this evidence means that whatever
framework is agreed upon, it must help the poor
of Kenya and other African countries to meet
these goals. The power to make decisions that affect
their lives requires greater emphasis on building
democratic governance and accountability; access
to equal opportunities depends on addressing
inequalities and exclusions across class, gender,
religion, clan and other grounds of
discrimination; an enabling environment to sustain
their livelihoods depends on inclusive and pro-poor
economic development, underpinned by secure
access to supportive and high-quality services. 
In talking about the future they want, people
presented a catalogue of experience ranging
from chronic vulnerability through narratives of
exclusion, discrimination, corruption, insecurity
and crime, inadequate skills and lack of
opportunities to own assets. Unlocking the African
moment requires removal of these hindrances. It
is important to note that this depends on a
composite ‘package’. Improvements in any
particular domain will be greatly undermined by
failures in others. 
4 Concluding remarks
This analysis suggests that Kenya cannot be said
to have achieved any MDG goals and targets as a
result of the MDG process, as such. There has
certainly been some progress in some of these
areas, and this has to an extent been influenced
or driven by the MDG framework. However, the
sense that the MDG process was an externally
driven process intended to precipitate aid flows
has in many ways marginalised and perhaps
confused the process of expanding national
ownership for basic development outcomes. 
In the current context in Kenya, the country is
well positioned to influence the Post-2015
Development Agenda through the MDG and
SDG processes. However, a more strategic
approach amongst those institutions and
individuals involved is required for this
opportunity to yield the desired results. Given
the particular issues that affect the new Kenyan
leadership, and its desire to influence the
international process, it is hoped that the
necessary improvements can be realised. 
A bigger question, however, is whether a
development framework is likely to precipitate
transformative change. International human
rights treaties establish standards that provide
for human dignity, equality and opportunity, but
the lives of the poor fall far short of almost every
provision. There is a risk that a development
framework will dilute the imperative of the
human rights framework, focusing instead on a
more limited selection of symptoms of poverty
and rights failures. In so doing, it would not
support the aspirations of the poor, and indeed
might reduce prospects for transformative
change. Ensuring that the post-2015
development framework is sufficiently ambitious,
and takes a rights-based approach, remains a
critical challenge. 
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